Borders, Walls and Frontiers

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In this set of reflections, I consider the political role played by borders and walls in Europe today, set briefly in the context of examples of how walls and borders were used in the last century and more recently and more deeply to how the idea of borders and walls and borders and security has impacted on European political development since 1945. My argument is that borders, walls and frontiers are an expression of human needs but like most, if not all, human desires and needs there is an essential paradox to them, a logical dissonance. Humans want the security of borders and walls but they also seek to escape them. Borders and walls can inhibit liberty but they can also protect liberty it.

But borders and walls are not frontiers. In the tv series "Star Trek", space was described to a US audience as the "final frontier", "final" because there were no longer frontiers to be reached on earth. But on earth the frontier was largely an expression of expansionism, and often to the detriment of those who territory was overrun. At some times and in some places, the construction of borders and walls safeguarded the liberty and security of citizens; at others, as we shall see, it undermined and destroyed them.

Now, in the autumn of 2019, we rightly celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the great, peaceful popular movement of 1989 that brought about the end of Communism in Europe, the liberation of eastern Europe from Soviet rule, symbolised for so many in what was the opening of the Berlin

Wall on 9 November 1989, an opening that was also a "fall" of a border and a wall.

It is perhaps significant that someone coming from the UK to Eastern Europe will at once have to affirm that this anniversary, a commemoration of the dignity and power of ordinary citizens, of the opening of borders and of the destruction of a brutal and inhuman wall that had divided East and West Europe, is scarcely, if at all, remarked upon in the UK. We are at present involved in a change of equally epic proportions, namely the ending of our 40 year relationship with the European Community and then Union, which is made concrete in the erection of borders and the closing of frontiers, not their opening.

Borders were opened in one part of Europe 28 years ago, but today they are closing in another part of the continent (the Brexit vote does not alter geography). This is the paradox, the logical dissonance that is resides in the DNA of politics.

In the case of Britain and Brexit, it must be said that Britain is in truth divided, split down the middle, not a Kingdom that is not united. It would be wrong to say that everyone wants the return of borders and frontiers. "We the people" is a concept that exists only in the minds of Brexit supporters and their political leaders. Whilst the latest opinion polls (21–23 August 2019) show that only 26% of voters support a Brexit without a deal and 35% don't want Brexit at all (48% think it was the wrong choice, 41% the right one), 33% want a return to borders and frontiers of some kind between the UK and the EU ("of some kind" because the border that would have to exist in Ireland once the UK's regulations diverge from those of the EU automatically require a border there, whether physical or virtual). Our lack of concern with the events of thirty years ago is almost certainly an indication of our national indifference; few are inclined to investigate the irony of the position in which the UK now finds itself. For many, especially Brexit supporters, the UK is fortunate in being able to imagine itself as cut off from the European continent and its history and politics.

Nor should it be forgotten that even if Communism in Europe has to all intents and purposes been removed, Russian power and Russian dominance in the eastern part of the continent continues to represent a major threat to those who share a border with Russia. If 1989 removed the specific border and borders that divided East and West Europe, other borders have

sprung up to take their place. The ongoing fighting in the east of Ukraine is but one example. Our European continent remains divided even if its most vicious borders have been moved eastwards, from the centre of the continent to its Eastern edge. The Baltic Republics (as we explore) are now protected by the secure shield that is NATO but no one would suggest that shield is not needed, or the threat posed by Russia disappeared thirty years ago.

In order to better understand this paradox, the rejection of borders and frontiers thirty years ago, and the enthusiasm for them in some quarters, and not just in Britain we should think about their implications for the course of European history in the last century.

Whether in Roman times, whether in the era of the two World Wars of the last century, or whether in our contemporary world, borders and walls are a core feature of all states, all governments, of governance and politics. They exist in physical space but also in an intellectual sense.

At their core, in a conceptual sense, lies the duty of the sovereign state, any state, to deliver physical security from political threats or enemies whether to the state and its rulers, or the state and its citizens.

The building of walls and borders for protection has been a key means of developing from within a polity (whether a city state or a nation state) a distinctive culture as well as political power. Civilisation would be impossible without the safety offered to it from within the confines of walls and borders. Without the walled cities of Italy to protect it, the Renaissance would never have taken root in Europe.

Stephen Greenblatt quotes Epicurus in his masterly study, *The Swerve* (2011), who distils the concept of security, and walls to provide it, in this way "Against other things it is possible to obtain security but when it comes to death itself we human beings all lived in an unwalled city". Walls are good. Death, against which we cannot build a wall and where we are unwalled, is bad.

At the same time, Europeans at any rate, have lived for several centuries with a parallel concept, especially perhaps in the USA. This is the idea of frontiers, borders and walls which are extendable, behind which the rule of law and civilised values may be developed.

In my own field of politics and governance, borders, walls (and frontiers) have been, and are, of critical importance. Not all borders are walls but all

walls are always borders, whether between one state and another, or one neighbour and another (we recall the old English proverb that "high walls make good neighbours"). Borders and walls are definitive and defining. Frontiers are more fluid and can, like the frontier in the USA, be extended to the West and to the South. Frontiers can move.

Borders and walls exist not just to distinguish the essence of one state from another, but express at a very fundamental level the right of the sovereign states and of the power of its governments to regulate entry and deny it, so constraining the freedom that so many humans wish, to move and to roam throughout the globe and take their chances with economic and political systems different from those into which they were born. As we see not least from the flood of migration via Arab North Africa at present borders and walls are political but they are also economic.

States use borders to control access to their territory and some states also use walls for the same purpose. Some governments use borders to keep their own people confined within the space they control; equally, some states build walls to keep people out and restrain them from entering their territory whilst other states build walls to keep people in defined spaces.

It is easy to see that free citizens of free nations will want as few limits on their own freedom of movement within their own states, or that within a free association of nations, such as the European Union, they will want as much freedom of movement, and ease of movement (which is not entirely the same thing) as is possible.

Precisely because borders and walls are an expression of sovereignty and political power they have featured strongly in the world as new states have emerged. In Europe the development, since 1648, of the concept of constitutional statehood within defined limits, in accord with Westphalian principles has given borders a particular significance and, since 1945, as older more established states disappeared or had their borders re-drawn, their relationships to their neighbours had to be reinvented time and time again and the purpose of those borders has changed.

Add to these European developments the idea of a European Community in which state sovereignty was pooled in the interests of distinct political and economic goals and, once again, the significance of borders had changed and developed over time.

Whilst every schoolchild knows (or should know) about the Great Wall of China, designed almost two thousand years ago to keep the Mongols out of the China, walls constructed to keep people in spaces are thankfully rarer in contemporary Europe.

It is sometimes said that both the First and Second World wars were about little more than territory, and controlling it. Of course this is not untrue but the idea of controlling territory carries with it the need to protect it with borders and to exploit what it offers within it.

The Prussian and German attack on France in 1870 which ended with the complete defeat of France had two, long-lasting outcomes. The first was the promulgation of the German Reich in the Palace of Versailles in 1871 and the second was the removal of Alsace-Lorraine from France and its transfer to Germany. How remarkable, how symbolic that the German Reich was born in France, born out of an aggressive attack on one nation by another.

What does this say for the culture of the Reich and its approach to the idea of sovereignty? And whilst it is true that Alsace-Lorraine had been fought over throughout history, its becoming a "Reichsland" not only made its annexation a sign to all the European nations that the German Reich was in business but produced not just a fundamental source of resentment against the Reich by the French but also a source of ongoing hostility and further fighting at some point in the future.

It was always said that the French never spoke of what they regarded as the national humiliation and injustice that was the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, but that they thought about it all the time. *Mutatis mutandis*, it was said about the West Germans during the Bonn Republic that they spoke of reunification all the time, but never thought about it.

When it 1919-20 peace-making took place it was in Versailles that this peace was made. A defeated Reich was forced to give up vast swathes of territory (as clear revenge for the Reich's annexing not just of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 but the annexations that demanded by the Reich and agreed to by the Bolshevik regime in Russia in the 1918 Peace of Brest-Litovsk).

As everyone knows, the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939 once again brought Germany and Russia into conjunction with each other in Eastern European lands that neither had any right to possess, with the destruction of sovereignty in Poland and the proudly independent Baltic Republics, and in 1940

the attack on France returned Alsace-Lorraine to German domination, the time accompanied by the whole of the French nation.

The concept of borders as a means of giving security to the Volk was as strong a feature in German Nazi thinking as was the concept of a frontier, extending eastwards to give "Lebensraum" to the Volk. This was set down by Hitler in *Mein Kampf* and it went on to drive the core vocabulary of his diplomatic demands vis a vis the West. As Tim Bouverie shows in his brilliant, recent study of appeasement, the competing claims of German and Czechoslovak nationalism ended in border changes to suit the Reich at the expense of the Czechoslovak state. When in March 1939 it became clear that Nazi foreign policy was about far more than the desire to protect "Germans" with a new border (the Suedeten Germans had actually never been Germans but Austrian), a major war was by now only a matter of time. There was an irony in the fact that the Nazi claim to the Suedetenland was, in a nationalist and border sense, far weaker than the Nazi claim to Danzig (which actually was a German city) but it had become clear by this date that Hitler's aggressive aims in fact had little do with nationalism and safe borders for Germans and everything to do with limitless expansionism.

At the same time, Hitler and his henchmen reintroduced the medieval ways of segregating the Jewish inhabitants of those areas in Eastern Europe that he overran. They were an even more evil re-invention of the ghetto of Venice of 1516 and a prelude to genocide, first by isolating human beings and subjecting them to deprivation all kinds and consequent massive loss of life by starvation and disease, and secondly by keeping them within strictly demarcated boundaries, making it easy, when the time had come, to round them up and move them to the places of extermination and the charnel houses the Nazis had set up.

Once the Third Reich had been destroyed by the grand wartime alliance of the UK, the USA (on whom Hitler declared war on 11 December 1941, four days after Peal Harbor, so starting a World War), and the USSR (the Kremlin having been obliged to recognise the utterly disastrous outcome of its own policy of appeasing of Hitler during the early hours of 22 June 1941) a reaction Stephen Kotkin describes so vividly in his book "Waiting for Hitler', borders that had been on the agenda ever since 1941, now became high policy decision.

Having destroyed the vast concentration camp that was Nazi occupied Europe, from the Atlantic Wall, the concrete border to the West and the ever-extending frontier to the East (finally stopped at Stalingrad in 1943), the peoples of Eastern Europe very soon found themselves once more behind borders, walls, the Berlin Wall whilst those in the West of the continent saw their borders decline in significance. Two generations at least of Eastern Europeans tried to understand the process by which they were denied the future that the defeat of the Third Reich had appeared to promise them which led to Yalta in February 1945, generally held as the disgraceful selling-out of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union by the USA and the UK, either because the Americans and the British no longer cared what happened in Eastern Europe or because they were ill-prepared to confront or contain Stalinist expansionism.

As I myself attempted to outline in my (now inevitably outdated) 1987 book on Communist Subversion and British intelligence, it was wrong to blame Yalta, in broad terms, and more narrowly (following Timothy Garton Ash) the decision on the borders of the future Europe taken by the European Advisory Commission of 13 August 1945 (exactly 16 years before the building of the Berlin Wall along part of the agreed delineation).

Rather, it can be argued (as I did myself in 1987 and would still do) that the actual division of Europe into a Western and Soviet bloc was not the outcome of an agreed policy of the appeasement of Stalin but more an attempt by the West to face up with the realities that stemmed from the military defeat of Nazism and their own inability to address the threat of Russia other than by developing nuclear weapons. Lord Gladwyn, for example, who had been involved, was emphatic about this: "The suggestion that Europe was carved up at Yalta is an illusion. It was carved up by the advance of the Soviet armies into Eastern Europe... At Yalta efforts were made to make the situation less intolerable, as far as we could, for the Poles and other nationalities. We didn't succeed but I don't think you can criticise Yalta for having carved Europe up".

In my view, British leaders genuinely did know precisely what Stalin had in store for Eastern Europe, either because they chose not to know (for high policy reasons) or because there was genuinely no reliable or detailed information on which to base a judgement of Stalin's intentions. Sound foreign policy to confront an enemy or an adversary (in 1945 Stalin was

the latter, not the former) is based on intelligence, from both open (chiefly diplomatic) and secret sources (collected by intelligence agencies). Yet by 1945 we may recall that the UK Foreign Office itself said it knew virtually nothing about Russia. Our diplomats had to rely on the USSR for information about the USSR. As for secret intelligence about the Soviet Union (which might have revealed the real facts of his intentions) within days of Hitler's attack on the USSR, the British secret intelligence service, MI6, was instructed to cease secret operations against Russia, in keeping with the policy that the Soviet Union had been transformed from Hitler's ally into Britain's friend.

At the same time, Britain felt it was entitled to trust Stalin. In signing the Anglo-Soviet Alliance of May 1942, the Soviet Union had solemnly committed itself to "not seeking territorial aggrandisement" and to the principle of "non-interference in the internal affairs of the European peoples". Indeed both the USSR and the UK shared the goal of "safeguarding and strengthening the economic and political independence of all European countries".

It is true that Churchill had said, in January 1940 (following the Soviet attack on Finland): "Many illusions about Soviet Russia have been dispelled in these few fierce weeks of fighting...Everyone can see how Communism rots the soul of a nation. If at any time Britain and France were to make a shameful peace, nothing would remain for the smaller states of Europe but to be divided between the opposite though similar barbarisms of Nazidom and Bolshevism".

But it is equally true that on the evening of 22 June 1941 Churchill spoke on the BBC to say things now looked very different: "No one has been a more consistent opponent of Communism than I have for the past 25 years. I will unsay no word that I have spoken about. But all fades away before the spectacle which is now unfolding. The past, with its crimes...flashes away. I see the Russian soldiers guarding the fields which their fathers have tilled since time immemorial. I see them guarding their homes where mothers and wives pray...I see the ten thousand villages of Russia...where maidens laugh and children play. I see advancing upon all this in hideous onslaught the Nazi war machine...We have but one aim and one single irrevocable purpose. We are resolved to destroy Hitler and every vestige of the Nazi regime. From this nothing will turn us...any man or state who fights on

against Nazidom will have our aid, any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe. It follows that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the Russian people. The Russian danger is therefore our danger just as the cause of any Russian fighting for his hearth and home is the cause of free people in every quarter of the globe".

This was perhaps the highest of high policy and when Stalin said: "after the war there must be states with many different forms of government and it was not the Russian objective to set up a Communist state in Britain", this was perceived as a promise, perhaps out of ignorance, perhaps out of wishful thinking. Certainly in December 1943 Sir Fitzroy Maclean, a senior British intelligence officer with experience of the Balkans, questioned Churchill about what Stalin would do there after Hitler's defeat. Churchill asked him: "Do you intend to make Yugoslavia your home after the war? No sir, I replied. "Neither do I, and that being so, the less you and I worry about the form of government they set up the better. That is for them to decide".

Fear of Russian plans were vague, perhaps deliberately so. Against this it is sometimes said that in the "spheres of influence" agreement Churchill and Stalin reached in Moscow in October 1944, the former's tacit acceptance of Stalin's territorial ambitions was in evidence. But this agreement (on the back of an envelope) did not deal with all European states but only with Rumania (90% Soviet influence, 10% the West), Yugoslavia and Hungary (50% each), Greece (90% Britain, 10% the USSR) and Bulgaria (75% USSR, 25% the West) but this was about sharing influence.

By the time of Yalta (February 1945) Churchill plainly believed Stalin would extend Communism throughout the area he would ultimately control (he told his secretary on 23 January 1945: "Make no mistake, all the Balkans except Greece are going to be Bolshevised and there is nothing I can do to prevent it. There is nothing I can do for poor Poland either"). But in public, perhaps out of despair, he repeated his view that Stalin could be trusted: "I know of no government which stands to its obligations even in its own despite more solidly than the Soviet government". Indeed by the time Churchill had come to make his Iron Curtain speech 5 March 1946 in Fulton Missouri. This speech is often seen as the beginning of the Cold War (I myself would date it in August 1939 with the signing of the Hitler-Stalin pact but that is a different matter).

In his great speech Churchill said: A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organisation intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytising tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is deep sympathy and goodwill in Britain-and I doubt not here also-towards the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her western frontiers by the removal of all possibility of German aggression. We welcome Russia to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. We welcome her flag upon the seas. Above all, we welcome constant, frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty however, for I am sure you would wish me to state the facts as I see them to you, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.

Although Churchill's geographical description was not entirely correct (Berlin was situated on the Soviet side of the iron curtain but not eastern Germany), and whether or not my interpretation is correct that the iron curtain was the necessary outcome of ignorance about Stalin's true ambitions and an inability to countenance any means of countering them short of a war no one in their right mind would want, for the next two generations the continent was divided.

But the consequences of Europe's division were as brutal as they were profound.

As Tim Garton Ash wrote (I would quibble with his reference to "frontiers", he means "borders": "Frontiers have always divided peoples but no frontier in modern European history has divided peoples as completely as

did those between Eastern and Western Europe at their most impenetrable. The cliché once expressed a truth: these frontiers were like an "iron curtain".

"If West European states had voluntarily surrendered part of their sovereignty to the European Community, East European states had generally attempted to claw back some of the sovereignty which they had involuntarily surrendered in the 1940s and 1950s".

"Even if you did not see it, there was ...even in the 1980s, one great divide... There was a reality of "Eastern Europe" and a reality of "Western Europe" and you knew when you had crossed the line. Even if you did not actually see the "iron curtain" with barbed wire and guard dogs..."

"If you lived at the bottom end of the Friedrichstrasse you got liberal democracy, the Americans, the European Community, the Costa del Sol, the Volkswagen and McDonalds. Your brother who lived three blocks up the street got communism, the Russians, Comecon, the Black Sea, the Trabant and soljanka".

As Garton Ash concludes: "This was the "Yalta" division of Europe: distinguished from previous divisions of Europe by its historical arbitrariness, its absoluteness, the asymmetrical roles of partly extra-European, nuclear-armed superpowers, the congruence military, political and economic differences".

With the passage of the years, the division of Europe for the West, at any rate, came to be symbolised by the Berlin Wall, constructed thirteen years after the borders between East and West had been agreed. As Willy Brandt wrote (in a letter to Nehru): "the barred walls of a concentration camp have now been erected inside Berlin". Yet Brandt himself had to see how the desire to maintain the status quo meant that even the murder of a would-be refugee from the East (Peter Fechter) trying to climb the Wall, shot by East German guards, just a few meters from Checkpoint Charlie produced no tangible reprisals by the West. Brandt wrote "whatever happened, the two superpowers would respect the spheres of influence broadly agreed at Yalta".

Yet 28 years later, as part of the great people's movement against Soviet domination and the inhumanity of the Communist system, the Berlin Wall fell. This is not the place to ask whether the Berlin Wall fell (leading to German unity) because of what was happening elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

As Garton Ash reports there were those who believed that it was so. Michael Wolffsohn said the word "reunification" should be spelt HUNGARY because Hungary's decision first do dismantle what was literally an iron curtain along its frontier with Austria, beginning in May 1989, and then specifically to let East German refugees out to the West, starting on 11 September, were the immediate external causes of the collapse of the Honecker regime in East Germany. Such a claim is of course highly contestable. Some would maintain that, for a start, it was unification, not reunification, that this should be spelled Gorbachev...another popular spelling among German politicians after unification was Helsinki, whilst in America and Britain the alternative NATO was often preferred. Others again would write Europe meaning the West European Community..."

It seems probable that at least in part the key to unlocking the Soviet stranglehold on Europe lay through German diplomatic efforts encapsulated in Willy Brandt's "Ostpolitik". His policy of "*Wandel durch Annaeherung*" which removed the threat of revanchism and even for a time helped East German Communism survive for longer than it deserved ultimately brought the two German states together, and thereby showed that Soviet rule, now conducted by Gorbachev, was flaky and could be countered. But equally the brave citizens of East Germany were inspired by the actions of others in Eastern Europe, in Poland and in the Baltic States, where the two million who linked hands across three republics demonstrated in "The Baltic Way" that they no longer feared the Soviet and Communist security and intelligence apparatus that had kept them under lock and key in effect since 1945. It could, of course, have been different with a different (and perhaps more efficient) leadership in the Kremlin but the fact was that to refuse to re-produce in Europe the Tiananmen Square massacre was also a crucial breakthrough.

The realities and the tangible successes of West European economic and then political integration led to altered perceptions amongst politicians and people about the role of borders. Helmut Kohl liked to recall how as a young activist after the war he had torn down a border post between France and Germany. The free movement of EU citizens enshrined in the Schengen Agreement of 1985 was testament to this innovative attitude towards borders. Just as the economic linkage between the states of the European Community removed the need for trade barriers, tariffs and so borders, it

also removed the need for borders, and wall, between the citizens of this Community.

Logically, perhaps, an optimist would have thought that 1989 would mark the end of the era of borders and walls. But it was not to be. In Northern Ireland the hundred "peace walls" built there since 1969 were made redundant by the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 but this Agreement is now under threat as a direct result of the vote to Brexit.

The biblical territory of Palestine and Israel is scarred by the "security barrier" or wall constructed 2000–2003 in the Occupied Territories. In the USA president Donald J Trump is constructing his own wall to keep immigrants out of the USA.

Paradoxically, perhaps, if the enlightened ideas that produced the project called European integration is to survive for another generation, the removal of borders and walls within the continent of Europe may have to be balanced by the erection of more secure barriers along the external borders of the European Union, particularly those that face Arab North Africa and therefore the further gateway from entire continent of Africa and Indian subcontinent.

Massive spending by the European Union is necessary in these parts of the world if the migration crisis is to be stemmed and refugees encouraged to see their future in their own lands, rather than in Europe. In time, however, these borders could become frontiers, extending the opportunities that come with liberalism, democracy and prosperity, rather than barriers simply to keep migrants out.

There is no doubt in my mind that the creation of a European Community, and now a European Union, delivered unparalleled freedom, security and prosperity to 450m Europeans and served, during the Cold War, as a beacon to those denied it which helped undermine the hold exerted by the Soviet Union. Without the European Union, the people's revolt against Soviet rule and Communist inhumanity, would almost certainly been unsuccessful and may even not have occurred at all.

However, I would suggest, EU leaders particularly Angela Merkel misunderstood that a deeply humane decision to allow in 1.5m migrants from Africa and Asia in 2015, made by a woman who had grown up in a Communist State with a very troubled attitude towards the use of borders and walls, would inevitably lead to a strong counter-reaction by those citizens

of the EU who felt threatened by immigration. This was a fear that could be exploited and was exploited. It should have been foreseen.

It was one thing to have no internal borders within the EU but another to fail to protect the EU's *external* borders. Equally, in the shadow of Islamist terror, it was a grave error not to realise quickly that borderless Europe made it easier for Islamist terrorists to strike at will throughout the EU.

Today, when the European Union must confront the unwanted crisis precipitated by the decision to Brexit taken by 52% of British voters, and its implications for Ireland and peace there, along with many other crises of which the continued flood of migrants from Arab North Africa is but one, it is on the one hand very important that political leaders understand that the wish for security from external threats is not illegitimate and must be properly articulated.

It is vital to do so if Brexit, which is my opinion is a folly without parallel in modern European political development, does not undermine the basis principles of European integration and shared sovereignty (a principle which also underpins NATO, of course). If ever there was a country in which sharing sovereignty and borderless security delivery makes sense it has to be Ireland.

By paying attention to the legitimate wishes of free people to live securely, and see the risks from internal and external threats reduced by means of strong but peaceful borders the work of integration will be enhanced, not reduced. In this way, perhaps, borders (and especially walls) which are static may, over time, be transformed into frontiers. In the case of the EU, these external frontiers may extend peace, prosperity and security beyond Europe itself into those lands whose dangerous conditions generate refugees, poverty and civil wars. Europe needs new frontiers, perhaps – but not a return to old internal borders and walls.